Dronenburg v. Zech: Sexual Preference Discrimination Sanctioned in the Name of Judicial Restraint by Winn, Jeffrey Michael
Pace Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 4 Summer 1985 Article 5
June 1985
Dronenburg v. Zech: Sexual Preference
Discrimination Sanctioned in the Name of Judicial
Restraint
Jeffrey Michael Winn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Michael Winn, Dronenburg v. Zech: Sexual Preference Discrimination Sanctioned in the Name of
Judicial Restraint , 5 Pace L. Rev. 847 (1985)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/5
Dronenburg v. Zech: Sexual Preference
Discrimination Sanctioned in the Name of
Judicial Restraint
I. Introduction
Tolerance of homosexuality has not prevailed in the Anglo-
American legal tradition.1 Although the trend in the past two
decades in both England and the United States has been toward
decriminalization of private consensual homosexual acts between
adults, 2 the United States Armed Forces have remained intran-
1. Sir William Blackstone, the eminent eigthteenth century English legal scholar,
summed up the common law's treatment of deviate sexual preferences in the following
way:
What has been here observed, especially with regard to the manner of proof,
which ought to be more clear in proportion as the crime is the more detestable,
may be applied to another offence, of a still deeper malignity; the infamous crime
against nature, committed with either man or beast. A crime which ought to be
strictly and impartially proved, and then as strictly and impartially punished. But
it is an offence of so dark a nature, so easily charged, and the negative so difficult
to be proved, that the accusation should be clearly made out: for, if false, it de-
serves a punishment inferior only to that of the crime itself.
I will not act so disagreeable a part, to my readers as well as myself, as to
dwell any longer upon a subject, the very mention of which is a disgrace to human
nature. It will be more eligible to imitate in this respect the delicacy of our Eng-
lish law, which treates it, in its very indictments, as a crime not fit to be named:
"peccatum illud horrible, inter christianos non nominandum."
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216.
As early as 1533, sodomy was a felony offense, which was punishable by death. 25
Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1533). In 1861, England abolished the death penalty and fixed the mini-
mum punishment for sodomy at 10 years penal servitude. Offenses Against the Persons
Act, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 61 (1861). The minimum punishment was abolished in 1891.
Penal Servitude Act, 54 & 55 Vict., ch. 69, § 1 (1891).
2. Private consensual homosexual conduct has been decriminalized in England. See
HOME OFFICE SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION (WOLFENDEN REPORT) 9-10, 20-21, 24, 79-80 (1957), re-
printed in S. KADISH & M. PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 6-9 (2d ed. 1969).
As of 1979, 21 states have decriminalized homosexual conduct: Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Po-
sition of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 799, 950-51
(1979). In addition, New York's sodomy statute was declared unconstitutional in People
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sigent.3 Perhaps as many as 3000 servicemembers each year are
administratively discharged under the Pentagon's rigid anti-ho-
mosexuality directives." In and of itself, homosexuality has little
correlation with a soldier's capacity to render competent mili-
tary service.5 The Pentagon has steadfastly maintained, how-
ever, that homosexuality is per se disruptive behavior.' Federal
v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980).
Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia still proscribe private consensual
homosexual conduct by statute: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Ri-
vera, supra, at 949-50. For further information, see MODEL PENAL CODE art. 207
commentary (Tentative Draft no. 4 1955) (arguing for decriminalization).
3. See infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
4. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 53 (1971). One
antihomosexual directive stated:
Department of Defense policy requires prompt separation of homosexuals.
The homosexual person is considered unsuitable for military service and is not
permitted to serve in the Armed Forces in any capacity. His presence in a military
unit would seriously impair discipline, good order, morale, and security. Further,
the Department of Defense has an obligation and responsibility to provide our
young men and women in the Armed Forces with the most wholesome and health-
ful environment possible.
U.S. Dep't of Defense Policy on Homosexuals in the Armed Forces, App."A," reprinted
in Comment, The Aftermath of Saal v. Middendorf: Does Homosexuality Preclude Mili-
tary Fitness? 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 491, 491 (1982).
5. Everhard, Problems Involving the Disposition of Homosexuals in the Service,
JAG BULL., Nov. 1960, at 20.
6. The Pentagon's regulations provide in part:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military
of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements,
demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the
accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such members adversely
affects the ability of the Military Services to maintain discipline, good order, and
morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among service-members; to ensure
the integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and
worldwide deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and work
under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members
of the Military Services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service
and to prevent breaches of security.
32 C.F.R. § 41.6 app. A, pt. 1, (H)(1) (1984). For similar Navy regulations, see 32 C.F.R.
§§ 730.10(b)(7), 730.12(b)(5) (1983), removed by, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,224 (1983). The Navy
no longer publishes its regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations. The source direc-
tives (SECNAV Instruction 1900.9) upon which they were derived remain in effect. Since
James Dronenburg was discharged from the United States Navy, both Pentagon and
Navy regulations will be discussed. See also Comment, Employment Discrimination in
the Armed Forces - An Analysis of Recent Decisions Affecting Sexual Preference Dis-
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/5
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cases indicate that it may be of little consequence in a discharge
proceeding that a homosexual servicemember's duty record is
otherwise exemplary.7
Despite an increasing number of constitutional right to pri-
vacy challenges by homosexual servicemembers, the United
States Supreme Court has never granted certiorari in a case con-
cerning sexual preference discrimination in the armed forces. In-
deed, the Court recently stated: "Whether constitutional rights
are infringed in sexual preference cases, and whether some com-
pelling state interest can be advanced to permit their infringe-
ment, are important questions this Court has never addressed,
and which have left the lower courts in some disarray."8
In Dronenburg v. Zech,9 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals became the first circuit court to directly ad-
dress whether the principles enunciated in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut10 and subsequent Supreme Court cases, which recognized a
crimination in the Military, 27 VILL. L. REv. 352 (1981).
7. See Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Belier
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (three Navy servicemembers discharged due
to their sexual preference despite untainted service records); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Naval petty officer discharged due to his sexual preference
despite exemplary service record). But see Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C.
1976), vacated and remanded, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (case remanded for Navy to
prove appellant homosexual servicemember did not come within the purview of the ex-
ceptions contemplated by the regulations by reason of his exemplary record); Matlovich
v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978), 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1251 (1980) (after being discharged solely because of his sexual preference, Tech-
nical Sergeant was reinstated because it was determined that his exemplary service rec-
ord was not accorded any weight in the Air Force's decision to discharge him); ben-
Shalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Army Drill Sergeant
who was discharged due to her sexual preference was reinstated by federal judge because
Army failed to show that her sexual preference compromised her military capabilities).
8. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 45 S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B1138, B1145
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1980) (denying appellant's substantive due process, right to privacy, and procedural due
process claims); Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) (denying ap-
pellant's procedural due process, substantive due process, right to privacy, equal protec-
tion, and first amendment claims); benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (sustaining petitioner's first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendment
claims); Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984)(available May 23, 1985,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) vacated and remanded, No. 84-1482 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 1985) (upholding petitioner's first amendment claim, but not discussing petitioner's
right to privacy claim because relief was granted on first amendment grounds).
9. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).




constitutional right to privacy, implied protection of consensual
homosexual conduct in the military. Writing for a unanimous
court, Judge Bork asserted that although the Supreme Court
may create new constitutional rights, a panel of the court of ap-
peals should not be so presumptuous; according to Judge Bork,
legislatures, not courts, are the proper place to recast sexual mo-
res." The Dronenburg court, therefore, agreed with the Navy
that a petty officer who admitted performing homosexual acts
with a subordinate recruit was justifiably discharged and pos-
sessed no discernible constitutional right to privacy.12
Part II of this Note discusses the applicable military regula-
tions, the Supreme Court cases concerning the constitutional
right to privacy, and the lower federal cases that have addressed
the right to privacy of homosexuals in the military. Part III
presents the facts of Dronenburg, the circuit court opinion, and
the dissenting opinion filed with the court's denial for a rehear-
ing en banc. Part IV analyzes the opinion of the circuit court,
focusing on the court's interpretation of the Supreme Court
right to privacy decisions and the role of judicial restraint in
constitutional jurisprudence. Part V concludes that the Supreme
Court's right to privacy cases evince a privacy right that sub-
sumes private consensual sexual conduct. Thus, a homosexual's
right to privacy should be classified as fundamental and in-
fringements on that right should warrant strict scrutiny review.
II. Background and Historical Development
A. Military Regulations Concerning Homosexual
Servicemembers
1. Regulations before 1949
The Pentagon's treatment of homosexuals within its ranks,
although never particularly enthusiastic, has evolved through
many stages. 13 During World War II, the "section VIII" dis-
11. Id. at 1396-97.
12. Id. at 1397-98.
13. For an authoritative examination of military-homosexual relations, see West &
Glass, Sexual Behavior and the Military Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 250 (R.
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charge1 4 provided for "prompt separation of those exhibiting va-
rious types of deviant behavior," in which "sexual perversion"
(including homosexuality) was a recognized malfeasance."5 Sec-
tion VIII discharges of enlisted men were effected through ad-
ministrative procedures, rather than by court-martial.' 6
Toward the end of World War II, through the influence of
the Surgeon General's Office, the military relaxed its policy with
regard to homosexual servicemembers. 17 The Pentagon further
liberalized its policy in 1945 by allowing homosexual ser-
vicemembers to be honorably discharged if the accused pos-
sessed an otherwise exemplary record and had committed no ho-
mosexual offenses.' 8
After 1947 this more lenient attitude toward homosexual
servicemembers toughened. 9 It has been suggested that the
shift in Pentagon policy was a sign of the times and paralleled
contemporaneous congressional inquiries concerning homosexu-
als in government.2 0  During this time, homosexual ser-
vicemembers were considered both "military liabilities" and "se-
14. See West & Glass, supra note 13 at 251. (A Section VIII discharge provided for
the immediate discharge of servicemembers, who displayed certain types of objectionable
behavior, under the heading: "Inaptness or Undesireable Habits or Traits of Character."
Specific sexual offenses were not enumerated.)
15. Id.
16. Note, supra note 13, at 465. The administrative process began with a three-
member board of officers. In the event that the panel found a section VIII discharge was
warranted, the discharge was labeled either "white" (with honor) or "blue" (without
honor). A vast majority of the section VIII discharges were white. Homosexuals dis-
charged under section VIII, however, typically received blue discharges, which indicated
the "exhibited maladjustment was more severe from a moral standpoint." Id.
17. West & Glass, supra note 13, at 253. The Surgeon General's Office was pivotal in
the formulation of U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, CIRCULAR No. 3 (1944), which provided that only
homosexuals who were "apprehended or were reported to have performed homosexual
acts" were to be discharged. Id. Confirmed homosexual officers were allowed to resign for
the good of the service, and enlisted men were given "blue" section VIII discharges. The
Surgeon General had advocated conferring "white" discharges, but "blue" discharges
continued because the Pentagon feared that "many homosexuals who were well-adjusted
would seek to be discharged and that others might claim to be homosexual for the pur-
pose of getting out of the Army with honorable discharges." Id. at 253-55. For an expla-
nation of the distinction between "white" and "blue" section VIII discharges, see supra
note 16.
18. West & Glass, supra note 9, at 253-54.
19. Id. at 255.
20. Id. at 255-56. See SENATE COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPART-
MENTS, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. Doc.
No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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curity risks."21
2. Current regulations
The Secretary of Defense is empowered by Congress to set
forth regulations for the governance of his department. 2 Pursu-
ant to this authority, the Pentagon has mandated that "homo-
sexuality is incompatible with military service."23 Separation
from military service is required for all homosexuals unless one
of a few narrow exceptions allowing retention applies.24 The bur-
den of proof lies with the accused servicemember to show that
retention is warranted.2 5 If the alleged homosexual conduct is
private, consensual, and between adults, an honorable discharge
is recommended when sexual preference is the sole basis for
separation.2
21. Security breaches in the State Department were alleged by the Senate to have
occurred because of the distinctive risks posed by homosexual employees. West & Glass,
supra note 13, at 256.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1977).
23. 32 C.F.R. § 41.6 app. A, pt. 1, (H)(1) (1984). See supra note 6.
24. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(1)(c), which states in relevant part:
c. The basis for separation may include preservice, prior service, or current
service conduct or statements. A member shall be separated under this section if
one or more of the following approved findings is made:
(1) The member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another
to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are approved further findings
that:
(a) Such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary
behavior;
(b) Such conduct under all the circumstances is unlikely to recur;
(c) Such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimida-
tion by the member during a period of military service;
(d) Under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued
presence in the Service is consistent with the interest of the Service in proper
discipline, good order, and morale, and;
(e) The member does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in homosex-
ual acts.
(2) The member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual unless
there is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual.
(3) The member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of
the same biological sex (as evidenced by the external anatomy of the persons in-
volved) unless there are further findings that the member is not a homosexual or
bisexual and that the the purpose of the marriage or attempt was the avoidance or
termination of military service.
25. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(e).
26. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(2), which states in relevant part:
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/5
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Administrative discharge processing commences once the
military has probable cause to believe separation is warranted.
If the Administrative Board concludes that the allegations are
supportable by competent evidence, the servicemember is rec-
ommended for discharge unless the Board finds that an enumer-
ated exception applies.2 8 If the Board recommends retention, the
Separation Authority29 may either approve the Board's find-
ings3 0 or send the case to the Secretary of the applicable service
branch, who has the authority to discharge the accused.3 ' If the
Board recommends discharge, the Separation Authority can ei-
ther approve the finding,32 disapprove the finding due to lack of
evidence, 3 or recommend retention of the accused under one of
the enumerated exceptions. 4
2. Characterization or description. Characterization of service or description of
separation shall be in accordance with the guidance in section C. of Part 2. When
the sole basis for separation is homosexuality, a characterization Under Other
Than Honorable Conditions may be issued only if such a characterization is war-
ranted under section C. of Part 2 and there is a finding that during the current
term of service the member attempted, solicited, or committed a homosexual act
in the following circumstances:
a. By using force, coercion, or intimidation;
b. With a person under 16 years of age;
c. With a subordinate in circumstances that violate customary military supe-
rior-subordinate relationships;
d. Openly in public view;
e. For compensation;
f. Aboard a military vessel or aircraft; or
g. In another location subject to military control under aggravating circum-
stances noted in the finding that have an adverse impact on discipline, good order,
or morale comparable to the impact of such activity aboard a vessel or aircraft.
This regulation also precludes courts-martial in appropriate cases. Id. at pt. 1
(H)(3)(f)(5).
27. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(a). For complete Board procedure and rules which govern all
administrative discharges see id. at pt. 3, (A)-(D).
28. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(b)(1). The Board consists of three officers, either commis-
sioned or noncommissioned, or senior enlisted personnel, if appointed. Id. at pt. 3,(c)(5)(a)(1).
29. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(c). The Separation Authority is a special court-martial con-
vening authority which consists of a commanding officer and a judge advocate or legal
advisor. Id. at pt. 3, (B)(4)(a). The Separation Authority reviews the Board's findings as
a higher authority. Id. at pt. 3, (B)(6)(A)-(D).
30. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(d)(1)(a).
31. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(d)(1)(b).
32. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(d)(2)(a).
33. Id. at pt. 1, (H)(3)(d)(2)(b)(1).




The second stage of the military's administrative discharge
process consists of review boards authorized by federal statute."
For example, the Navy provides for a Board of Correction of Na-
val Records.36 The Board is comprised of civilians3 7 and has the
authority to correct any naval record when necessary to rectify
alleged errors or to cure injustices.3 8 The procedure and machin-
ery provided is similar to appellate review in the civilian con-
text.39 After an examination of the relevant documentation and
evidence, the Board makes a formal recommendation to the Sec-
retary of the Navy. 0 The Secretary may, at his discretion, reject
or adopt the Board's recommendation."' The Secretary's final
decision is subject to review in federal district court. 2
Generally, federal courts require the servicemember to ex-
haust his administrative remedies before bringing suit against
the military. 3 This doctrine has been disregarded, however,
when judges have found that remanding the case would be fu-
tile." When the armed forces' administrative remedies would be
unavailing, the resolution of a claim founded solely upon a con-
stitutional right is suited to a judicial forum.'3 But the Supreme
ceedings, in which case the Separation Authority will determine the accused's fate. Id. at
pt. 1, (H)(3)(d)(3)(a)-(b).
35. 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1983).
36. 32 C.F.R. § 723 (1984).
37. Id. at § 723.2(a).
38. Id. at § 723.2(b)-(c).
39. Id. at §§ 723.3-.11.
40. Id. at § 723.6(e).
41. Id. at § 723.7.
42. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-83 (1958).
43. Champagne v. Schlesinger, 507 F.2d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 1974) (homosexual ser-
vicemember required to exhaust administrative remedies before litigation); Krugler v.
Secretary of Army, No. 83-8265 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1984) (available Feb. 1, 1985, on
Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file) (homosexual servicemember required to exhaust her ad-
ministrative remedies before resorting to federal court).
44. Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (A homosexual ser-
vicemember was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because Navy regu-
lations mandated discharge for all homosexuals.); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192,
196-97 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1980) (The trial judge declined to require homosexual servicemember to exhaust her ad-
ministrative remedies because Navy regulations mandated discharge for all
homosexuals.).
45. Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. at 211; Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. at
196-97. See, e.g., Heliman, The Constitutionality of Discharging Homosexual Military
Personnel, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 191, 194-96 (1980).
[Vol. 5:847
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Court has consistently counselled that great deference is due
when federal courts review matters of Pentagon policy and pro-
cedure."' As the cases reveal, the military's latitude is wide.47
B. The Right to Privacy
1. History
The first duty of a responsible government is to protect citi-
zens in their persons and property.' This duty goes to the heart
of the common law.4 Before Brandeis' day, the common law
46. This principle was forcibly enunciated in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-
94 (1953), in which the Court held that Pentagon discretion to assign duties to a ser-
vicemember should be carefully guarded. Justice Jackson stated: "[Jiudges are not given
the task of running the Army. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as
scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupu-
lous not to interfere in judicial matters." In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65
(1981), the Court upheld male only draft registration. In an opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist, the Court held that this "case arises in the context of Congress' authority over
national defense and military affairs, and in perhaps no other area has the Court ac-
corded Congress greater deference." Finally, in Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11 (1973),
the Court declined to continue judicial oversight concerning National Guard training and
weaponry, holding:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the
courts have less competence. The complex subtle, and professional decisions as to
the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially
professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legisla-
tive and Executive Branches.
47. See benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 970 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984).
48. See J. LocKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 395 (J. Laslett ed. 1963); THE
FEDERALIST No. 17 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
49. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-630 (1886). Justice Bradley's re-
marks are worth quoting at length:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitu-
tional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case
then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all inva-
sions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rum-
maging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some pub-
lic offence, - it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and consti-
tutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.
Id. at 630. In In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (1887), Justice Field wrote:
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves,
not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private
9
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provided remedies for the physical encroachment upon life and
property."0 At the turn of the century, during a period when so-
ciety experienced rapid social change, the common law began to
recognize basic privacy rights of individuals. 1 The intellectual
genesis of a right of privacy is generally acknowledged to have
come from Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren's article in the
Harvard Law Review in 1891.52
The right to privacy principle was not expressly acknowl-
edged by the Supreme Court until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.53 In Griswold, the Court held that Connecticut's anticon-
traceptive statute violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment because it deprived married persons of
the fundamental right to make intimate marital decisions con-
affairs, books, and papers, from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the
enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half their value.
Id. at 250. See also J. LANDER, ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 81-87 (1973) (examining
the origins of the common law and Henry II's twelfth century reforms to better protect
persons and property).
50. See Weeks. v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. at 624-30 (1886); see also F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, 17-
32 (A. Chaytor ed. 1981); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 206-46 (1881).,
51. Poe v. Ullman. 367 U.S. 497, 518-19 n.9 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas wrote:
The due process clause is said to exact from the states all that is "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." It is further said that the concept is a living one,
that it guarantees basic rights, not because they have become petrified as of any
one time, but because due process follows the advancing standards of a free soci-
ety as to what is deemed reasonable and right.
Id. See also RUBENSTEIN & FRY, Right of Privacy: The Third Specific Deprivation, in OF
A HOMOSEXUAL TEACHER: BENEATH THE MAINSTREAM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITIES 48,
48 (1981).
52. S. Warren & L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1891).
Brandeis had occasion to expound his views once he ascended to the Supreme Court in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-81 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual na-
ture, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sen-
sations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the most valued by civilized men. Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's
purposes are beneficient. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel inva-
sions of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
53. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/5
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cerning procreation by regulating the marital relationship with-
out a rational or legitimate basis."
After Griswold, Whalen v. Roe5" was the Supreme Court's
most comprehensive attempt to define the constitutional right to
privacy. 6 At issue in Whalen was a New York statute that re-
quired pharmacists to provide the state with a copy of every pre-
scription for certain enumerated drugs.57 The Court held that
neither the immediate nor threatened impact on privacy of the
patient identification provision in the statute was onerous
enough to invalidate New York's legitimate interest in attempt-
ing to control the dissemination of dangerous drugs."8
The Court in Whalen enunciated a framework for analyzing
54. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated: "[Sipecific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance . . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy ....
Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure." Id. at 482-84
(citations omitted). The Court, however, made clear in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), that although the Constitution provides protection against particular govern-
mental intrusions into personal and private matters, no general right to privacy exists.
Id. at 350-51.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court curtailed state police power to regu-
late abortions. In holding that a Texas abortion statute violated the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, compiled a history
of the "personal and private" matters the Court has protected:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as. . .[1891], the Court has recog-
nized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or indi-
vidual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First
Amendment,. . . in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ... in the penumbras of
the Bill of Rights, . . . in the Ninth amendment, . . . or in the concept of liberty
guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . These deci-
sions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" ... are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to
activities relating to marriage, . . . procreation, . contraception, . family re-
lationships, . . . and child rearing and education . .
Id. at 152-53. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (in which a
New York statute that restricted distribution of contraceptives, in the absence of a com-
pelling state interest, was declared unconstitutional because it violated the right to pri-
vacy and the fourteenth amendment).
55. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
56. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886 (1978).
57. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 593.
58. Id. at 598.
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the constitutional right to privacy. Relying on Paul v. Davis,59
Justice Stevens asserted that the right of privacy entails some-
thing more than "the least common denominator of the Court's
prior decisions" 60 concerning procreation, contraception, child
rearing, and marital choice. 1 Two distinct types of privacy in-
terests were articulated.2 The first interest was the individual
interest in keeping certain personal matters private.6 3 The sec-
ond interest concerned the individual's interest in unimpeded
discretion with regard to certain important personal decisions.64
A unanimous Court held that because New York had a justifia-
ble end - the control of stolen or revised drug prescrip-
tions65 - and because the means used to attain that end were
the least restrictive available,66 the individual privacy interests
of persons in need of treatment - fear that the state's accumu-
lated data would be made public and stigmatize them as ad-
dicts - were not impermissibly invaded. 7
The issue of whether consensual homosexual conduct is pro-
tected by a constitutional privacy interest has never been
59. 424.U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (where the Court found that the actions of a Police
Chief in distributing flyers of defendant, an active shoplifter, did not abridge defendant's
liberty or property rights under the fourteenth amendment).
60. L. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 886.
61. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 n.26.
62. Id. at 598-99.
63. Id. at 599. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (The right to be let alone is the right most valued by civilized man.); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 483 ("[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is
protected from governmental intrusion."). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (quoting with approval Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. at 478).
64. Id. at 599-600. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 ("This right of privacy. . . is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
this choice altogether is apparent."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 11-12 (The freedom
to marry one of another race cannot be proscribed by state statute.) For the historical
antecedents to the right to privacy enunciated in Roe, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (The freedom to educate one's own children in a parochial school
was found to be constitutionally protected.); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(The freedom to acquire knowledge of the German language was found to be constitu-
tionally protected.).
65. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 591.
66. Id. at 603. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55
(1951) (setting forth least restrictive means requirement).
67. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 602.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/5
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granted full plenary review by the Supreme Court. Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney68 is the only Supreme Court case that has
addressed the issue of whether consensual homosexual conduct
is constitutionally protected.
2. The Doe case and the right to privacy standard of
review
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney 9 the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed7 0 the judgment of a divided three-judge dis-
trict court sustaining Virginia's statute prohibiting sodomy. Doe,
like other Supreme Court privacy cases, 71 involved choosing be-
tween the Court's two levels of scrutiny of substantive due pro-
cess rights.72  Historically, the Court has protected certain
noneconomic substantive due process rights, but economic rights
have received virtually no substantive due process protection
since the 1930's.73
When economic rights are impaired by a statute, the Court
merely requires a rational connection between the law and the
legitimate state ends.1 4 When the Court finds that a fundamen-
68. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
69. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
70. Unlike denials of certiorari, a summary affirmance is considered a judgment on
the merits, although no opinion is written and no oral agrument is heard. See infra note
143.
71. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text. For discussion of the Court's two-
tier analysis of substantive due process cases, see infra notes 74-79 and accompanying
text.
72. "Substantive due process," as defined here, refers to freedom from arbitrary
state action. See, e.g. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (A state law required that
any parent legally responsible for child support payments could not remarry unless (1)
payments were made in full, and (2) there was a showing that the child would not likely
become a ward of the state. The Court held the law to be a denial of substantive due
process rights and equal protection of the law.).
73. See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) See
infra note 171.
74. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (The Court stated that
the fourteenth amendment due process clause would no longer be employed to strike
down state laws regulating business, because they may be unwise or out of harmony with
a particular school of thought. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 381 (1937) (A state minimum wage law for women was
upheld upon application of a rational basis test.); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537
(1934) (New York's regulations for milk-pricing were upheld as rationally furthering a
13
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tal noneconomic right has been curtailed by statute, heightened
scrutiny is applied;7 5 the government's ends must be both legiti-
mate and compelling, and the ends must be closely related to
the means. 76 Whether or not a right is fundamental is an impor-
tant distinction. If the right is not fundamental, and the state
objective is found to be legitimate and rationally connected to
the statute, the Supreme Court shows complete deference to the
legislature."
An analysis was conducted by the district court in Doe to
determine which level of scrutiny was warranted. The three-
judge panel held that the Supreme Court had never defined the
right to engage in homosexual conduct as a "fundamental
right. '78 Additionally, the panel concluded that Virginia's objec-
tive - the promotion of morality and decency - was legiti-
mate. 79 Finally, because no fundamental right was at stake and
because the Commonwealth's end was a valid one, only a ra-
tional connection between the sodomy statute and the objective
was required. 0 The court concluded that the Commonwealth's
legitimate state end.).
75. United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
76. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 503-04 (White, J., concurring); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. In fact, the fundamental right de-
termination has been virtually dispositive of whether the statute survives or not. Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. In these circumstances, the level of scrutiny is extremely low. No statute regu-
lating economic rights has been voided by the Court on substantive due process grounds
since Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935 was held unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds.).
78. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp at 1201-03.
79. Id. at 1202-03.
80. Id. In dissent, District Judge Merhige disputed the majority's contention that
the state had a legitimate interest or rational basis to support the statute's application:
The defendants, represented by the highest legal officer of the state, made no
tender of any evidence which even impliedly demonstrated that homosexuality
causes society any significant harm. No effort was made by the defendants to es-
tablish either a rational basis or a compelling state interest so as to justify the
proscription of § 8.1-212 of the Code of Virginia, presently under attack. To sug-
gest, as defendants do, that the prohibition of homosexual conduct will in some
manner encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent the dissolution of ex-
isting ones is unworthy of judicial response. . . .Whether the guarantee of per-
sonal privacy springs from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, the penumbra of the
Bill of Rights, or, as I believe, in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
fundamental rights of such an intimate facet of an individual's life as sex, absent
circumstances warranting intrusion by the state, are to be respected.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/5
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assertion that homosexual conduct was likely to contribute to
immorality was sufficient to uphold the statute."1 Virginia was
not required to show that delinquency was actually produced by
homosexual conduct. 82 Similarly, in the cases discussed in the
following subsection, the military was not required to prove that
homosexual conduct actually produced the adverse effects
claimed.
3. Military cases after Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
Courts in five federal circuits have addressed the issue of
whether military regulations proscribing homosexuality violate a
servicemember's constitutional right to privacy." Of these
courts, four have decided the issue on the merits. The Ninth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia circuits have denied the ser-
vicemember's claim.8' In contrast, a Wisconsin federal district
court recognized a lesbian servicemember's right to privacy be-
cause no homosexual conduct was alleged. 5
The decisions in the Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia
circuits which denied the homosexual servicemember's claim
had three things in common."6 First, each court practiced time-
honored deference to the military. 87 The armed forces main-
tained that the nature of the military mission was such that dis-
cipline, good order, morality, and mutual trust were concerns
Id. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
81. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
82. Id.
83. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of Army,
735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980); ben-
Shalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Matthews v. Marsh,
No. 82-0216 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984) (available Sept. 1, 1984, on Lexis, Genfed library, Dist
file), vacated and remanded, No. 84-1482 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 1985). In Matthews, a Maine
district court reinstated a self-professed lesbian ROTC cadet, but on first amendment
grounds. Although the cadet claimed a deprivation of a right to privacy, the court re-
fused to address the issue. Id.
84. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397-98; Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d at 1228;
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 810.
85. benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. at 975.
86. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397-98; Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d at 1228;
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 810.
87. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398; Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d at 1228;
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 812. Each case involved both homosexual conduct by
the servicemember and an allegation by the servicemember that Pentagon regulations




paramount to individual liberties, and in each case convinced
the court that respect for military judgment was warranted.88
Second, each court concluded that Pentagon policies requiring
the mandatory processing for discharge of homosexual ser-
vicemembers served a legitimate state interest, namely, preserv-
ing the integrity, efficiency, and success of the military's mis-
sion. 9 A rational basis standard was therefore applied; and the
military was only required to prove that homosexuals were likely
to have an adverse effect on the military mission. 90 Finally, each
court held that the Supreme Court's privacy decisions never de-
fined the right so broadly as to encompass homosexual activity."
In benShalom v. Secretary of Army,92 a Wisconsin federal
district court granted a servicemember's mandamus request to
be reinstated after she was discharged solely on the basis of her
homosexual status.93 Although the servicemember was a self-
professed lesbian, the Army was unable to allege any homosex-
ual conduct.9" Because no homosexual conduct was alleged, the
servicemember claimed that she was denied both her constitu-
tional right to privacy and freedom of association under the first
amendment.96 The court stated that the privacy of the inner-
most parts of one's personality was so "fundamental" or "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" that constitutional pro-
88. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 801, 802 n.9; Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735
F.2d at 1227 n.7; Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44
(1974) (The military was given deference when it denied an Army doctor the right to
make antiwar speeches on an army base.).
89. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398; Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d at 1228;
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 812.
90. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398; Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d at 1227 n.7;
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 812. In Beler, the court declined to decide whether a
"fundamental right" was at issue. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 807. The value of its
substantive due process analysis as precedent, therefore, is limited. In Rich, the court
likewise refused to decide whether a fundamental right was at stake. Rich v. Secretary of
Army, 735 F.2d at 1228. Only in Dronenburg did the court address this issue, and it
unanimously held that homosexual conduct was not a fundamental right. Dronenburg,
741 F.2d at 1397.
91. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397-98; Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d at 1228;
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 810-12.
92. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
93. Id. at 977.
94. Id. at 969.




tection was warranted. 9" A homosexual "personality," without
more, was not sufficient to warrant discharge.9 7 Because the
Army could not show that Ms. benShalom's sexual preference
compromised her effectiveness as a drill sergeant, the regulation
requiring discharge was unconstitutional." It was within the
background of these federal court decisions that the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals examined the constitutional
right to privacy in Dronenburg v. Zech."
III. Dronenburg v. Zech: Factual Setting, the Opinion of the
Court, and the Motion Denying a Rehearing En Banc
A. The Facts
On April 21, 1981, James L. Dronenburg, a twenty-seven
year old petty officer and student at the Defense Language Insti-
tute in Monterey, California, was discharged from the Navy for
repeated homosexual conduct. 100 Dronenburg was a Korean lin-
guist and cryptographer who had served in the navy for nine
years. In addition, when he was discharged, Dronenburg had an
exemplary service record and a top security clearance. In Au-
gust, 1980, a nineteen year old seaman and student at the Insti-
tute made statements under oath alleging that he and
Dronenburg had engaged in repeated homosexual conduct. Sub-
sequently, the Navy commenced an investigation of Dronenburg,
and after first denying the charges, he acknowledged that he was
a homosexual and that he had engaged in homosexual activities
on the Navy base.101
Pursuant to the applicable directive, 02 the Navy notified
96. Id. at 975. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
97. benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. at 976-77.
98. Id. at 977. Because a fundamental right was implicated, the court required a
higher level of scrutiny than the rational basis review set forth by the Ninth, Tenth, and
District of Columbia Circuits. A nexus was thus required to satisfy a strict scrutiny re-
view. Although the government's interest was compelling - the need for discipline and
good order - the regulation was invalided because it mandated the discharge of all
homosexuals. Absent a showing of deviant conduct and a diminished military capability
on the servicemember's part, the means-ends relationship was not close enough. Id.
99. 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
100. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
101. Id.




Dronenburg on September 18, 1980, that it was contemplating
discharging him for misconduct because of his homosexual acts.
103 Dronenburg was brought before a Navy Administrative Dis-
charge Board on January 20 and 22, 1981. Accompanied by an
attorney, he testified and admitted engaging in homosexual con-
duct in the barracks. The Board unanimously recommended
that Dronenburg be discharged. Of the three board members,
two voted to have Dronenburg generally discharged, while the
third member voted to give him an honorable discharge. The
Secretary of the Navy later reviewed the case at Dronenburg's
request and ordered that the discharge be categorized as
honorable.
On April 20, 1981, Dronenburg filed suit in federal district
court, contesting the Navy's policy of mandatory discharge for
all homosexual servicemembers.10 4 In an unreported opinion, the
district court granted the Navy's motion for summary
judgment. 10 5
B. The Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal, James L. Dronenburg argued two constitutional
theories: a constitutional right to privacy and a right to equal
protection under the law.'06 The court reasoned that the equal
protection claim was to some extent dependent on the right to
privacy claim; if homosexual conduct was not a constitutionally
protected privacy right, then equal protection was not infringed
unless the Navy's policy of automatically processing all homo-
sexuals for discharge was not rationally related to a legitimate
end. 10 The court held that homosexual conduct was not a fun-
damental right and that the Navy's discharge policy was ration-
103. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
104. Id.
105. Id. (discussing the holding in Dronenburg v. Zech, No. 81-933, (D.D.C. Oct. 5,
1982)(unreported decision)).
106. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391. As a threshhold matter, the circuit court in
Dronenburg rejected the Navy's contention that there was no subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 1389-90. This Note does not address this issue.
107. Id. at 1391. The Supreme Court's equal protection analysis is analogous to its
treatment of noneconomic rights under substantive due process. See supra notes 73-82
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the various Supreme Court right to privacy




ally related to the Navy's objective of maintaining discipline,
morality, and good order in the military. 108
Whatever the common line of reasoning decipherable from
Griswold and its progeny, the Dronenburg court concluded that
it was not so broad as to include protection of private consensual
homosexual conduct. 10 9 The Dronenburg court's exegesis of the
Supreme Court right to privacy cases was that, although the de-
cisions provide an "illustrative list" of what is protected, the Su-
preme Court had expressly denied in Roe v. Wade" 0 that the
right was so broad as to say that one was free to do anything
with one's body."' Neither Roe nor presumably any other Su-
preme Court decision had ever articulated an "explanatory prin-
ciple" to which lower courts could look to discern what consti-
tuted protected privacy." 2 Because the facts in Griswold and its
progeny related to such matters as marriage, procreation, family
relationships, child rearing, and education, a right to homosex-
ual conduct could not be implied. "1 The Dronenburg court con-
cluded that if homosexual conduct was "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," then all private sexual behavior was pro-
tected, which was a conclusion the court was unwilling to
make."
Relying on dicta from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ull-
man" 5 and the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney,"' the court held that if state action
108. Id. See also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1976) (A county regula-
tion limiting the length of policemen's hair was held to be rationally related to the gov-
ernmental objective of promoting safety of persons and property.).
109. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391.
110. 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
111. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153-54).
112. Dronenberg, 741 F.2d at 1395-96.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1396.
115. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court held that a chal-
lenge to Connecticut's anticontraceptive statute was nonjusticiable. Justice Harlan, in
dissent, set forth arguments that urged invalidation of the statute on grounds substan-
tially adopted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In his dissent, Justice
Harlan argued that although there was a right to privacy of constitutional dimension, all
consensual activity should not be protected, and it was a permissible exercise of state
police power to proscribe homosexual conduct.
116. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See supra




to prohibit homosexual conduct was constitutional in the civilian
context, then such action was certainly valid in the military con-
text.1 17 Moreover, the court observed that although summary af-
firmances were "somewhat ambiguous precedent," the Supreme
Court's summary disposition of a case from its appellate docket
was a decision on the merits. 18 Consequently, Doe was binding
on inferior courts. 119
The Dronenburg court explained its role in the case as one
of a disinterested arbiter, rather than as a policymaker on mo-
rality.120 Espousing principles of judicial restraint, the court as-
serted that a lower federal court, unlike the Supreme Court, was
not free to create new constitutional rights. 121 Thus, the two
issues open to review were whether the Supreme Court had cre-
ated a right that was pertinent to the dispute's facts, or whether
the Court had specified an analytical framework that covered
homosexuality. 22 The court held that the Supreme Court has
never created a constitutional right to privacy for homosexual
conduct. 2 3 Furthermore, the Griswold line of cases embodied no
discernible explanatory principle to define the contours of pro-
tected privacy; therefore, the court had no unified standard to
apply. 24 Absent both a fundamental right and a unified princi-
ple, a minimum rational basis review was conducted, and the
military's need for discipline and good order was enough to sus-
tain the regulation.12
C. The Denial of the Motion for a Rehearing En Banc
James L. Dronenburg's request for a rehearing en banc was
denied in a one paragraph per curiam opinion by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals on November 15, 1984. 121
117. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
118. Id. See also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975).
119. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. See also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 343-45.
120. Dronenberg., 741 F.2d at 1392.
121. Id. at 1396 n.5.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1395-96.
124. Id. at 1395.
125. Id. at 1398.
126. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984), per curiam denying re-
hearing on Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judges Bork, Scalia,




Chief Judge Robinson dissented on primarily two grounds. 127
First, Chief Judge Robinson maintained that the three-judge
panel's exegesis of the constitutional right to privacy was unnec-
essary. 12 8 Whatever the origin of the right to privacy, the dissent
asserted that it was clear that the principles underlying the Su-
preme Court's decisions were by now fairly established."' By
confining Griswold and its progeny to their facts, the panel had
abdicated its judicial responsibility. 130 Chief Judge Robinson
concluded that such a use of judicial restraint was as inappropri-
ate as would be a decision sustaining all privacy claims the Su-
preme Court had yet to reject.'31
Second, Chief Judge Robinson maintained that Doe, which
was a pre-enforcement dispute regarding a state criminal stat-
ute, was distinguishable from Dronenburg, which was a constitu-
tional challenge to a Pentagon regulation not explicitly estab-
lished by Congress.13 2 Chief Judge Robinson concluded that
according Doe sweeping precedential value disregarded the time-
honored principle that summary disposition of a case by the Su-
preme Court necessarily resolves the dispute between the liti-
gants on the "narrowest possible grounds." 133
Wald, Mikva, Edwards and Chief Judge Robinson dissented. Id.
127. Id. at 1580-81 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1580.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. In her statement supporting denial of the petition for rehearing, Judge
Ginsburg disagreed with the dissent's position: judicial restraint did not require inferior
court judges to propose the direction of "further enlightment" from the Supreme Court.
Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d at 1581 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
In his statement supporting the denial of the rehearing, Judge Bork defended the
three-judge panel's interpretation of the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases. Id. at
1582. Inferior courts owed the Supreme Court obedience, Judge Bork stated, not
"unquestioning approval." Id. at 1583. Absent a unifying principle with which to base a
new constitutional right, courts ought not to usurp prerogatives the Constitution has left
to the legislature. Id. In his statement supporting the denial, Judge Starr agreed that the
right to privacy protects the home, decisions concerning childbirth, and traditional rela-
tionships. Id. at 1584. Furthermore, the principles set forth in those privacy cases did not
preclusively bar the government from regulating consensual sex outside traditional rela-
tionships. Id.
132. Id. at 1580 . See supra notes 22-47, 66-82, and accompanying text.
133. Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d at 1580 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting). In her state-
ment supporting the denial, Judge Ginsburg agreed with the three-judge panel that Doe
v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), was binding. Dronenberg v. Zech, 746
F.2d at 1581 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 334-45
1985]
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IV. Constitutional Analysis
In Dronenburg, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance
in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney134 was dispositive 153 Fur-
ther, the court concluded that there was no unifying principle in
the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases. 136 Without a unify-
ing principle that embraced homosexual conduct, the court con-
cluded that homosexual conduct was not a fundamental right
and thus judicial restraint was appropriate.13 7 Moreover, the
court maintained that because homosexuality was not a funda-
mental right, the Navy's policy of automatically discharging
homosexuals must only be rationally related to its military mis-
sion. 138 The court concluded that the policy was rationally re-
lated and therefore it neither violated substantive due process
nor the equal protection clause. 139
The significance of Dronenburg will be primarily jurispru-
dential. Part of this significance lies in the court's constitutional
analysis: the extensive exegesis the court employed to reach a
very narrow conclusion concerning the right to privacy. 140 But in
(1975)). See also R. Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal" or "Conservative"
Technique, 15 GA. L. REV. 539, 547-58 (1981). For a discussion of the Hicks doctrine, see
nfra notes 144-150 and accompanying text. In his statement supporting denial, Judge
Bork proferred three reasons for suggesting that Doe controlled this case. Dronenberg v.
Zech, 746 F.2d at 1582 n.1 (Bork, J., concurring). Like Judge Ginsburg, Judge Bork felt
that the Hicks rule meant that Supreme Court summary affirmances were "fully bind-
ing," required the three-judge panel to follow Doe. Id. Further, Justice Brennan's sugges-
tion in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977), stating that the
Doe issue was still unresolved, was not tantamount to an overruling of Doe. Dronenberg
v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1582 n.1. Finally, Judge Bork reasoned that-because the Navy's regula-
tion in Dronenburg was less restrictive than the statute at issue in Doe, it followed that
the regulation was constitutional. Id. In his statement supporting the denial, Judge Starr
concluded that the three-judge panel had performed an "elementary judicial obligation"
in following Doe. Id. at 1584 (Starr, J., concurring).
134. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
135. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d at 1391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
136. Id. at 1391-96. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases,
see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973). See also supra notes 53-82 and accompa-
nying text.
137. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395-97.
138. Id. at 1397-98.
139. Id. at 1391. For a discussion explaining the rational basis analysis, see supra
notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
140. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391-98.
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view of the Supreme Court's apparent reluctance to address the
constitutional privacy rights of homosexuals,"" the conclusive
weight accorded by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe may have wide
implications in the other circuits.
A. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: The Precedential Value
of Summary Affirmances
The Dronenburg court's reliance on Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney 42 as a controlling precedent raises anew the issue of
how inferior courts should interpret Supreme Court summary
affirmances. Doe involved a federal constitutional challenge to a
state statute and as such was a direct appeal within the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 43
141. See Bd. of Education v. Nat'l Gay Task Force, No. 83-2030 (U.S. March 26,
1985) (available March 29, 1985, on Lexis, Genfed library, Sup file) (The Court, in a 4-4
deadlock, sustained a Tenth Circuit court which found an Oklahoma law proscribing
teachers from discussing homosexual issues as violative of the first amendment); Row-
land v. Mad River Local School Dist., 45 S. CT. BULL. (CCH) B1138, B1138 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (A case involving the termination of an Ohio school teacher who had
acknowledged her bisexuality was denied certiorari after a Sixth Circuit court denied the
teacher relief.); New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984) (Dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted in a case challenging a New York law which made homosexual
solicitation a crime.); Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1181 (1978) (Rehnquist &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that there was sufficient
confusion in the lower courts to warrant Supreme Court review of this issue); Gaylord v.
Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 434 U.S. 879 (1978) (denying certiorari to review a Wash-
ington decision which allowed a school board to presume that a homosexual teacher was
immoral and thus unfit to teach); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5
(1977) ("[T]he Court has not definitely answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sex-
ual] behavior among adults."). Professor Tribe has written that "Itihe issue of homosex-
ual rights is being left for another day, when public sentiment is clearer and legal theory
more fully developed." L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87 (Supp 1979). But
see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)) ("The facial constitutional valid-
ity of criminal statues prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitely'
established.").
142. 403 F. Supp 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afl'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
143. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Direct appeals from the decisions of three-judge district
courts are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1977). Under that provision, any party can
appeal to the Supreme Court "an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an
interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action. . . heard and determined by a
district court of three judges." Id. The decision to hear or make summary dispositions of
an appeal is made by the whole Court. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 757 (4th ed. 1983). If
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In Hicks v. Miranda,1 44 the Supreme Court held that a sum-
mary affirmance of a case within the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion, unlike a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari, consti-
tuted a judgment on the merits and thus was binding on lower
federal courts.14 5 Subsequently, in Mandel v. Bradley,146 the
Court indicated that summary dispositions prevent lower courts
from arriving at opposite conclusions on the precise issues neces-
sarily decided by the disposition. 47 Summary actions, however,
should not be construed as breaking new ground but rather as
applying principles previously established by the Court to the
particular facts involved. 48 Consequently, Justice Brennan, con-
curring in Mandel, suggested that in the future inferior courts
should accord "appropriate, but not necessarily conclusive,
weight" to the Supreme Court's summary dispositions.149
In Dronenburg, the court did not focus on the precise issues
decided by Doe. Instead, the court maintained that the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance gave no indication that it was based
four justices vote to hear an appeal, the case receives full plenary review. Id. If less than
four justices vote to hear the case, it is either summarily affirmed or dismissed for lack of
substantial federal question. Id. See Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S 246, 247 (1959).
See also Note, The Precedential Effect of Summary Affirmances and Dismissals for
Want of a Substantial Federal Question by the Supreme Court After Hicks v. Miranda
and Mandel v. Bradley, 64 VA. L. REV. 117 (1978). Both types of summary disposition
constitute a vote on the merits, and as such, they are binding on lower federal courts.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S at 344-45 (1975).
Similarly, a decision to grant or deny certiorari in a case is made by the whole Court.
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 757 (4th ed. 1983). If four justices vote to grant certiorari, it
is likely that the case will receive full plenary review. Id. at 756. If less than four justices
vote to hear a case, certiorari is denied. Id. Unlike summary disposition of appeals, how-
ever, denials of certiorari are not considered decisions on the merits. Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200, 226 (1950) (Frankfuter, J., dissenting) ("The denial means that this court has
refused to take the case. It means nothing else."). See also Linzer, The Meaning of Cer-
tiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1979).
144. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
145. Id. at 344-45.
146. 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam).
147. Id. at 176.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan maintained that in the
future the lower courts must "(a) examine the jurisdictional statement in the earlier case
to be certain that the constitutional questions presented were the same and, if they were,
(b) determine that the judgment in fact rests upon decision of those questions and not
even arguably upon some alternative nonconstitutional ground." Id. See generally Note,
supra note 143 (discussing the practical problems associated with implementing the
Hicks and Mandel rules).
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on rationale other than the lower court's constitutional deci-
sion.150 Moreover, the court extended the import of the summary
disposition well beyond the particular facts involved in Doe.
Doe involved a pre-enforcement challenge to a state statute
criminalizing sodomy.151 In contrast, Dronenburg involved a con-
stitutional challenge to a Navy regulation requiring mandatory
discharge of homosexual servicemembers.152 The Dronenburg
court ignored the important distinction between state statutes
and administrative regulations. In fact, the Court in Doe
adopted a view that homosexuality involves issues of morality
which can only be properly addressed by a state legislature.'
Thus, the Dronenburg court gave an administrative regulation
the presumptive validity belonging to a state statute. This led to
the mistaken conclusion that if a state statute proscribing homo-
sexual conduct is constitutional in a civilian context, then a sim-
ilar regulation is necessarily constitutional in a military
context. 54
Finally, the court's conclusive reliance on Doe is misplaced
150. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. The summary affirmance in Doe can be ex-
plained in part by the plaintiff's weak showing of ripeness and standing. For example,
not one of the plaintiffs had been indicted or convicted. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y,
403 F. Supp. at 1200. See also Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
233, 280 n.172 (1977).
151. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
152. Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d at 1580. Dronenburg was discharged pursuant to
a Naval directive which sets out official policy concerning homosexuals in the Navy and
is authorized by a general residual delegation of power to the Secretary of Defense from
Congress:
The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe
regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees,
the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preser-
vation of its records, papers, and property. This section does not authorize with-
holding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the
public.
5 U.S.C. § 301 (1977). Federal courts have recognized the power of Congress to delegate
to executive agencies the power to regulate. For example, see Georgia v. United States,
411 U.S. 526 (1973) (Section 301 of 5 U.S.C. constitutes ample legislative authority for
regulations promulgated by Executive department heads.); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13
(1879) (Regulations have the force of law.); Reed v. Franckle, 297 F.2d 17, 24 (4th Cir.
1961) (Because discharges of servicemembers come within the purview of Congress'
power to delegate, it is proprietous for the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regula-
tions regarding such discharges.).
153. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
154. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
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because after Doe, in Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 55 the
Supreme Court explicitly stated that the difficult consensual
acts questions raised in Doe were still undecided. 56 Thus, it re-
mains open whether the Supreme Court's privacy cases evince a
unifying principle that embraces homosexual conduct.
B. Unifying Principle: Private Consensual Sexuality
Although the Dronenburg court's presentation of the pri-
vacy cases was extensive, it was also selective and incomplete.
The court employed a lengthy exposition of the Supreme Court's
cases to conclude that the right to privacy cases provided an il-
lustrative list of rights, not an explanatory principle to identify
such rights. 157
Initially, however, the court implied that a thread of princi-
ple was discernible in the right to privacy cases. 158 This view is
supported by Whalen v. Roe,159 which the Dronenburg court
chose not to examine. In Whalen, the Supreme Court suggested
that the right to privacy meant something more than the least
common denominator of the Court's prior decisions concerning
procreation, contraception, child rearing, and marital choice.160
The Supreme Court in Whalen went further to hold that the
sum of the Griswold line of cases made manifest two distinct
privacy principles: 161 the interest of a person to keep certain
matters private and the unimpeded discretion of an individual
with regard to certain important personal decisions.
Concluding that the Supreme Court had merely provided an
155. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
156. Id. at 694 n.17. In a footnote to his dissent in Carey, Justice Rehnquist argued
that Doe "definitely" settled the the consensual acts question. Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l., 431 U.S. at 718 n.2. Yet Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974), asserting that summary affirmances carry noticeably
less precedential value than full opinions on the merits. This contradiction has not gone
unnoticed. Professor Tribe has commented that Doe, as precedent, stands for very little.
TRIBE, supra note 141, at 87. In addition, one commentary has termed Doe "an egregious
example of an unexplained summary affirmance." Hart & Wechsler, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 159 n.1 (1981 Supp.).
157. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395.
158. Id. at 1391. ("Whatever thread of principle may be discerned in the right of
privacy cases, we do not think it is the one discerned by [Dronenburg].").
159. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 598-600. See TRIBE, supra note 56, at 886.




illustrative list of privacy rights, the Dronenburg court observed
that none of the illustrations covered homosexual conduct. 62 As
suggested in Whalen, however, there is a thread of principle dis-
cernible in the right of privacy cases. The essence of the privacy
cases is that there is a privacy right inherent in private consen-
sual sexuality. This right embraces not only marriage, contracep-
tion, procreation decisions, and family relationships, but also
homosexuality.
The Dronenburg court refused to recognize such a privacy
right by utilizing an equivocal characterization of the right as
enunciated in Roe v. Wade. 6 ' The court emphasized Justice
Blackmun's statement in Roe that "it is not clear to us that the
claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right
to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship
to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's de-
cisions."'6 " The acknowledgement that one has a privacy right in
private consensual sexuality is not tantamount to asserting that
one has an unlimited right to do with one's own body as one
pleases. Moreover, such an overstatement of the right to be em-
braced on the one hand while confining the privacy cases to
their facts on the other hand belies the Dronenburg court's reli-
ance on judicial restraint.
C. Judicial Restraint
Judicial restraint is the philosophy that courts should not
invade the domain that the Constitution has reserved for the po-
162. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391.
163. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1394-95 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153-54).
164. Id. at 1395 (emphasis in original). The two cases Justice Blackmun cited in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154, to support this finding are factually distinguishable from
Dronenburg. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Court held that it
was within a state's police power to enact a compulsory smallpox vaccination law. Id. at
35-39. The state's duty to safeguard its citizens' health, although not absolute, was con-
siderable in the face of such a fatal disease. Id. at 38-39. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927), the Court upheld a Virginia statute providing for the sexual sterilization of insti-
tutionalized imbeciles as a valid health regulation within the purview of the state's police
power. A state's power to usurp an individual's procreative choices has since been cur-
tailed, and Buck today is accorded little stare decisis effect. See also Skinner v.
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litical branches of government.16 In Dronenburg, the court pre-
mised its application of judicial restraint on the conclusion that
there was no unifying constitutional principle that protected ho-
mosexual conduct."" Thus, to recognize Dronenburg's claim
would require creating a new constitutional right.1 6 7 But, as has
been demonstrated, a privacy right in private consensual sexual-
ity may be derived from the "text, structure, and history of the
165. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46-49, 86 (1962);
Thayer, The Origin and the Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Professor Bickel wrote that Thayer's article was "a singularly
important piece of American legal scholarship" concerning the doctrine of judicial
restraint:
The power of review, says Thayer, must be conceived of strictly "as a judicial
one," quite unlike, and distinct from, the functions of the political branches of
government. In discharging their limited office, the courts must be astute not to
trench upon the proper powers of the other departments of government, nor to
confine their discretion. Full and free play must be allowed to "that wide margin
of considerations which address themselves only to the practical judgment of a
legislative body." Moreover, every action of the other departments embodies an
implicit decision on their part that it was within their constitutional power to act
as they did. The judiciary must accord the utmost respect to this determination,
even though it be a tacit one.
BICKEL, supra at 35 (discussing Thayer). Advocates of judicial restaint often cite THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 518-19 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898), as unimpeachable
authority:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must per-
ceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judi-
ciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution: because it will be least in a capacity to annoy
or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword
of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes
the rules by which the duties, and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor
WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
See also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Courts ought not to adjudicate
political questions such as legislative apportionment.); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267
(1962) (Frankfuter, J., dissenting) (supporting the rationale of Colegrove); Mapp v. Ohio,
361 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Judicial restraint" embodies the prin-
ciple that past decisions should be accorded stare decisis effect.); L. HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 1-30 (1958)(Judge Hand sets forth his theory of judicial restraint.); Finkelstein,
Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 361-64 (1924) (Judicial restraint dis-
cussed in the context of early twentieth century national industrial policy).
1 166. "[Rlights must be fairly derived by standard modes of legal interpretation of
the text, structure, and history of the Constitution." Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396 n.5.




In addition, the court concluded that homosexuality is a
moral issue best reserved for the legislature.169 A prominent fea-
ture of each of the Court's privacy decisions, however, is that
they involve difficult moral issues."O It is precisely when the ma-
jority threatens to infringe the constitutionally protected rights
of the minority that the Constitution is properly invoked.
7 1
Furthermore, in its analysis of Doe, the Dronenburg court is
equating a legislative enactment with an administrative regula-
tion. 72 The same deference accorded to democratic choice is not
required in the case of regulations because they are not the
product of a democratic process. 73 Regulations are promulgated
168. Id. at 1396 n.5. See supra notes 157-164 and accompanying text.
169. Id. at 1397.
170. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (regulation of
dissemination of contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (availability of contraceptives to unmarried individuals);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscene materials within the home); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (activities relating to marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (availability of contraceptives to married couples); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state's power to control conduct of children); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928) (governmental wiretapping of a citizen's home); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 540 (1925) (child rearing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(education of one's children).
171. Justice Stone's famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938), is the jurisprudential genesis of this commonly accepted principle:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. ...
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities,
• . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations ommitted).
172. See supra notes 142-156 and accompanying text.
173. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1977). Regulations promulgated pursuant to this broad




by bureaucrats, not enacted after debate by a political body.
D. Equal Protection and the Court's Application of the Ra-
tional Basis Test
The Dronenburg court concluded that because no funda-
mental right was at stake, the Navy's regulation was only re-
quired to rationally relate to a legitimate state interest.1 74 The
court accepted the military's need for good order and discipline
as sufficient to uphold Dronenburg's discharge.175 But the
Dronenburg court never required the Navy to prove that the
petty officer's sexual preference necessarily compromised his
military abilities.
A better approach was used in benShalom v. Secretary of
Army, 76 in which a lesbian drill sergeant, discharged because of
her sexual preference, was reinstated by a Wisconsin federal dis-
trict court. The court held that the Army regulations infringed
her right to privacy because the Army was not required to prove
that the servicemember's sexual preference actually compro-
mised her capacity as a soldier. 177 The court concluded that Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney 78 provided little guidance for
lower courts, and that although "the peculiar nature of military
life" legitimated considerable Army control over the sexual con-
duct of servicemembers' 79 "constitutional privacy principles
clearly protect one's sexual preferences in and of themselves
from government regulation."
The benShalom court's right to privacy analysis was based
on the "nexus" requirement enunciated in Norton v. Macy.180
Unless the Army could prove that "actual deviant conduct" ex-
isted and without evidence of a nexus between the petitioner's
sexual preference and her military capabilities, the court would
174. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397-98.
175. Id. For a discussion of the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests, see supra
notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
176. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
177. Id. at 977.
178. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
179. Id. at 976.
180. 417 F.2d 1161, 1164-67 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (A homosexual federal employee was





not defer to the Army's regulation."' Because the Army made
no attempt to show such a nexus, the district court reinstated
the petitioner.'82 In Dronenburg, the Navy was not required to
show such a nexus. Had such a showing been required, as it was
in benShalom, the result may have been different. Objectionable
conduct occurs in the military in both homosexual and hetero-
sexual contexts. In both cases, misconduct can threaten security
or impair the integrity of the system of rank and command. By
contrast with the treatment of homosexuals, problems arising
from heterosexual relationships are treated by the Navy on a
case-by-case basis, suggesting that immediate discharge is not
rationally related to protecting the capacity of the military to
carry out its unique mission. 183 Homosexuals alone are "classi-
fied as 'intolerable' and singled out for 'prompt separation.' " "4
V. Conclusion
In Dronenburg v. Zech, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the discharge of a Navy petty officer
who was discharged solely because of his sexual conduct. The
servicemember's claim that such a discharge denied his constitu-
tional right to privacy was not recognized by the circuit court
because it concluded that homosexuality is not an activity that
has traditionally received constitutional protection. 8 The court
asserted that the Supreme Court's privacy cases, linked by no
unifying principle, are to be confined strictly to their facts.186
The Dronenburg court accepted Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney, 18 a summary affirmance, as dispositive of the right to en-
gage in homosexual conduct. 88
181. benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. at 976. The court also concluded
that application of the nexus test showed that the Army had acted "arbitrarily and ca-
priciously" towards petitioner, since her record was impeccable, thus infringing her fifth
amendment due process rights. Id.
182. Id.
183. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 201-02 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nor.
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Beller v. Leh-
man, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
184. Id. at 202.
185. Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1395 (D.C. Cir 1984).
186. Id. at 1396-97.
187. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).




The unifying principle of the Supreme Court's right to pri-
vacy cases, as set forth in Whalen v. Roe, 89 is that individuals
should be free from governmental intrusion into private matters
of intimate concern. A mature individual's choice of a consenting
adult sex partner is, by any standard, the conceptual minimum
implied by the right to privacy. 9 ' By failing to examine Whalen,
the Dronenburg court overlooked important precedent. Whalen
clearly states that the right to privacy cases are something more
than the least common denominator of their facts. 9"
Because Pentagon regulations mandate compulsory dis-
charge for all homosexual servicemembers, but provide case-by-
case evaluation, counselling, and rehabilitation for heterosexuals
charged with misconduct, the regulations must meet the require-
ments of the equal protection clause. 92 At a minimum, equal
protection requires that the military prove the validity of its as-
sertion that summary discharge of homosexuals is rationally re-
lated to preserving the integrity of military operations. The sim-
ple assertion, without proof, that "[tihe effects of homosexual
conduct within a naval or military unit are almost certain to be
harmful to morale and discipline,"' 93 fails to demonstrate that
immediate discharge of homosexuals is rationally related to ful-
filling the military's unique mission. Thus, the court's analysis of
the right to privacy was not only unjustifiably restrictive, it also
led to a failure to prove the rational basis of the Navy's
regulation.
Jeffrey Michael Winn
189. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
190. Gerety, supra note 150, at 280.
191. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
192 See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
193. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
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